


RIGA PAPERS

NATO IN THE AGE OF POPULISM

Ivan Krastev

Riga, Latvia – November 27 – 29, 2006



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Riga Papers

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PREFACE

Over the last decade it has become a tradition to gather the world's leading thinkers on NATO in advance of a major Alliance summit. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, along with the Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) and the Commission of Strategic Analysis, are proud to host this conference on the eve of the November 2006 Riga NATO summit.

This summit comes at a critical moment in NATO's history. The Alliance is deeply engaged in a difficult mission in Afghanistan and is at a critical juncture in terms of transforming itself for a very different strategic era in the 21st century. Should NATO aspire to new, more global missions in the wider Middle East and elsewhere? If so, then does it need new arrangements with non-NATO global partners? When and where should NATO seek to act and with what kinds of coalitions?

Should NATO continue to keep its door open to future enlargement to new democracies further East and South at a time when there are signs of enlargement fatigue in Europe? How should NATO transform itself to better be able to work together with the European Union around the world? And, what future should we envision for NATO-Russia relations in light of recent trends in Russia? Last but not least, does NATO have a role to play in new areas and on new issues ranging from energy security to homeland defense?

These are just some of the difficult questions that the Alliance must confront. In the spirit of stimulating thinking and debate on both sides of the Atlantic, we have commissioned five Riga Papers to address these and other issues.

In *Re~reinventing NATO*, Ronald D. Asmus and Richard C. Holbrooke provide a bold and ambitious American view on how to overhaul the Alliance so that it may assume more global responsibility and meet future global threats from two individuals deeply involved in NATO reform in the 1990s.


In *NATO's Only Future: The West Abroad*, Christoph Bertram offers a European perspective on the Alliance's future from one of the foremost thinkers and writers on NATO affairs on the continent. He warns that the Alliance is losing the support of its members and that it must do a much better job in addressing their real security needs by broadening its ambitions and horizons, if it is ever to regain its former centrality.

In *NATO in the Age of Populism*, Ivan Krastev analyzes the dangers of the rise in populism in Europe and the challenge this presents for maintaining public support for the Alliance as well as effective decision-making as NATO tries to respond to new global threats. He argues that the only way NATO can go global without falling victim to a populist backlash is to transform itself into a two-pillar Alliance.

In *Transforming NATO: The View from Latvia*, Žaneta Ozoliņa provides the perspective of a smaller, Northern European country on these issues and debates. This essay highlights the complexity of the challenge that NATO's transformation poses for smaller NATO members as well as ongoing priority and commitment to keeping NATO's door open for additional new members.

The fifth and final Riga Paper is entitled *NATO and Global Partners: Views from the Outside*. Edited by Ronald D. Asmus, it consists of four essays by authors from Israel, the Persian Gulf, Australia and Japan. These authors explore what their countries might expect from the Alliance in the future, as NATO seeks to develop a new concept of global partnership.

GMF is delighted to offer these papers as part of the intellectual legacy of this Riga conference and summit. We consider them a key contribution to the spirit of transatlantic debate and partnership that it is our mission to support.



Craig Kennedy
President of the German Marshall Fund of the United States

NATO IN THE AGE OF POPULISM

Ivan Krastev

NATO won the Cold War. NATO reshaped post-Cold War Europe. NATO is almost everywhere and it is prepared to do almost anything: to fight global terrorism in Afghanistan, to prevent genocide in Darfur, to train security forces in Iraq, to accept new members in the Caucasus, to become a global alliance. Renewed interest in NATO is a logical outcome of the failure of the United States' "coalition of the willing" strategy in Iraq and Europe's growing frustration with the ineffectiveness of the United Nations (UN). In all but the most extreme cases, unilateralism can be considered a thing of the past. And, in all but the most trivial of cases, the UN is paralyzed. At the beginning of the 21st century, NATO comes closest to the embodiment of effective multilateralism. NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 has become a model for the effectiveness and efficiency of multilateral action. The operation was a military success and regardless of the fact that it took place without sanction by the UN Security Council, it was legitimized by political consensus in NATO and the overwhelming support of public opinion in the world's leading democracies.

The new consensus in the West is that *"as the world's premier multinational military organization, comprising many prosperous nations with a vested interest in maintaining global stability, NATO is uniquely suited to meet the new global threats to the world order"*, and that *"NATO, almost alone among the alphabet soup of multilateral organizations, actually has a track record of working"*.²

"All we need is NATO ..." is the newest mantra in the Western strategic community. NATO is viewed as a guarantee against the rise of immature great powers, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the competition for diminishing fossil fuels and the democratization of destruction as ever smaller groups gain access to ever greater destructive power. But, the more discussion on the future role of NATO is dominated by the what-NATO-should-do school, the more urgent the need to reassess the security risks emanating not from outside NATO but from within the Alliance itself becomes. NATO might very well be the best instrument for solving world problems but it is not a wholly unproblematic alliance.

The results of the Transatlantic Trends Survey conducted annually by the German Marshall Fund in the United States and twelve European countries indicates that in the last three years support for NATO in Europe has dramatically declined. And, particularly alarming, the decline that has taken place in three of the principal European pillars of the Alliance. In Germany support for NATO declined from seventy-four percent in 2002 to fifty-six percent in 2006. In Poland support declined from sixty-four percent in 2002

¹ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO" in *Foreign Affairs*, September-October 2006.

² John C. Hulsman, "The Future of NATO", *Issues* 2006 and "The Candidate's Briefing Book", The Heritage Foundation, 2006. Available at <http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm>.

to forty-eight percent now, and only since 2004 support for NATO in Turkey declined from fifty-three percent to forty-four percent.³

In the case of Germany declining support for NATO is a direct result of public mistrust in the rationale and the motivations behind the U.S. global war on terror. In Poland, people are unhappy not so much with the United States as with Europe. Poland is terrified by Europe's growing energy dependence on Russia and the West's inability or unwillingness to act in the face of Russia's challenging behavior.

But, most alarming of all is the case of Turkey. Sandwiched between the specter of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq and the prospect of never ending negotiations with the EU, Turkish society openly questions its Western security identity. The Transatlantic Trends Survey demonstrates that Turkish public opinion has become more and more disappointed with the West and concomitantly more and more attracted by Iran. Support for NATO is declining and contrary to the case of its Western allies, Turkish public opinion feels threatened not by the rise of a nuclear Iran, but by the possible use of force against Teheran's nuclear ambitions.

In this situation it is by no means inappropriate to remind ourselves that at the NATO Treaty-signing ceremony on April 9, 1949, in Constitutional Hall, Washington, DC, the band played "I've Got Plenty of Nothing". It is ironic that NATO is busier than ever, with eight active operations, yet it is perceived by the public as less relevant than ever. Why European publics are increasingly skeptical about NATO is a question that the Riga Summit cannot afford to ignore.

The Transatlantic Debate

Where NATO could survive the transatlantic split over ongoing developments in Iraq is the question that has haunted the Western strategic community ever since the war started in 2003. The "schism" over Iraq threatened the West with a strategic decoupling of the Europe and the United States. Since then, efforts aimed at repairing transatlantic relations have focused on bridging four crucial gaps affecting Europe and the United States: gaps in threat perception, gaps in capability, gaps in ambition and the gaps in vision.

Gaps in Threat Perception

The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, revealed a gap in the perception of the threat of terrorism and the rise of political Islam between Europe and the United States. For the first time in the last sixty years Europe felt more secure than the United States. In the months following September 11, 2001, the United States felt like it was at war. Europe, for its part, got busy trying to avoid war. The publics on both sides of the Atlantic felt the threat revealed by the attacks asymmetrically. This asymmetry in the threat perception was viewed by policy analysts as a major risk for the readiness of the Alliance to respond to the challenge posed by international

³ "Transatlantic Trends 2006". This public opinion survey examining American and European attitudes toward the transatlantic relationship is conducted annually by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Available at www.transatlantictrends.org.

terrorism. But, according to these same analysts the gap would be bridged and support for NATO would increase if Europe itself would become the victim of terrorist attacks conducted by jihadists.

But, the results of the Transatlantic Trends Survey demonstrate different dynamics in the relationship between threat perception and support for NATO. Regardless of the fact that in the last three years, major terrorist attacks took place in Europe (Madrid, London) and irrespective of the fact that the public views in the United States and Europe have managed to bridge their differences somewhat with regard to political Islam, no significant convergence can be observed between the policy makers on the two sides of the Atlantic. Contrary to expectation, the fact that Europeans feel much more concerned about the threat of terrorist attacks and the rise of political Islam has not strengthened public support for NATO. The reason for this is that radical Islam is an external threat for the United States and for Europe it is an internal threat. European public opinion has responded to the threat of terrorism with a demand for a more active EU role in the field of homeland security and global affairs and remains critical of the U.S.-led global war on terror.

Gaps in Capability

The capability gap was at the center of the transatlantic debate prior to September 11, 2001. Military planners on both sides of the Atlantic will agree that this gap is a dangerous one. Indeed, the capability gap was among the major reasons for Washington's drive towards unilateralism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The American military felt handicapped by the lack of modernization of the military capabilities of their European allies. This gap is not narrowing, but paradoxically, it is losing at least part of its centrality. In both Iraq and Afghanistan the U.S. leadership has discovered the cost of acting alone. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that smart weapons are not enough. Boots on the ground are also needed.

Gaps in Ambition

2003 marked the highest point of Europe's ambition to position itself as a counterbalance to U.S. hyper power and the lowest point in the United States' appreciation of the emergence of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Analysts became obsessed with the rivalry between NATO and the EU over who has the right of first option in case of military operations. Many were convinced that NATO would be destroyed either by the EU's ambition to marginalize the role of the Alliance as a major security provider on the European continent or by Washington's unwillingness to envision any meaningful security role for the EU. This situation has changed. Iraq has demonstrated the limits of U.S. hard power and recent developments in the post-Soviet space have demonstrated the limits of European soft power. The United States has overwhelming power when it comes to destroying enemy capabilities, but it has proved to be less successful when it comes to controlling territories and underpinning the exercise of nation-building. On the other hand, recent political developments in Ukraine have demonstrated that the EU's transformative power is dependent on its readiness to offer membership. The soft power of the post-enlargement EU is dramatically limited in comparison with that of an EU that was ready to offer membership.

NATO skeptics view the EU's mission in Lebanon as a litmus test for its relevance in the future. In their view, if the mission succeeds the EU will gain new self-confidence and will prefer to operate on its own. In case of failure, we could witness a dramatic decline in the EU's willingness to intervene. The rise of isolationism both in Europe and the United States would be more damaging for the future of NATO than the much debated clash between European and U.S. ambitions. NATO optimists believe that NATO will be an essential part of a new transatlantic "contract" in which Europeans will minimize the very considerable risks they face in the world by legitimizing, on the basis of common agreement, U.S.-led structural interventions.⁴ It seems that there is agreement that the ambition gap is not the major threat to NATO's relevance.

Gaps in Vision

In the view of many, the great transatlantic debate over the Iraq war emanated from a profound disagreement over the nature of the "world order". In this debate, the United States favors the unipolar world in which it is a benevolent hegemon. Europe argues for a multipolar world and the supremacy of international law. This normative dimension of the debate conceals the more profound disagreement, not about the benevolence of U.S. hegemony, but about the sustainability of its hegemony. Paradoxically, the EU was the principal beneficiary of the unipolar moment in international politics, which was the strategic context in which the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe was made possible. What separates Europe and the United States today are not so much clashing views on the preferable world order but Europe's skepticism that a unipolar world can be preserved. Europe is convinced that we are back in the balance of power game. The United States still hopes that this is not the case. A further distinctive feature of the way both Europe and the United States debate the bridging of the transatlantic divide is that the stability of the liberal democratic order in both has continued to be taken for granted. There was grave concern about what was happening between Europe and the United States. But, notable is that while in Europe there may have been concern over what was happening in Bush's America, there was no real interest in what was happening in Europe in the United States.

The Populist Challenge

In the view of this author the real threat to NATO's future role in the world is rooted not in the threat perceptions gap between Europe and America, nor in the capability gap or the clash of ambitions. The real challenge is the lack of transatlantic consensus on the political nature of the world we live in. NATO has failed to recognize the complex nature of the global wave of democratization that started after the end of the Cold War and its impact on the security dilemmas that both Europe and the United States face. NATO has neglected the security threats coming from the transformation of the democratic regimes in the Alliance's own member states.

The world has entered the age of the populist revolutions. Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, *"What is distinctive about our time is that the United States and Europe, the most*

⁴ Julian Lindley-French, "Why America is stuck with NATO", *Europe's World*, Autumn 2006.

advanced part of the world, face a massive and unprecedented global awaking. That is something new in all of history. The world as a whole is experiencing today what French society as a whole experienced during the French revolution – a sudden stirring of political awareness, unleashed passions, fermenting excitement, and escalating aspiration. Today, that sense of revolution is the political reality worldwide and it is altogether new, though it has been developing over a number of decades. Today, even in the remote Nepal, Bolivia, and Kyrgyzstan, we see similar manifestations of political behavior. Today, in Somalia, East Timor, and Chechnya, we see similar manifestations of brutal violence. And through the world, we see similar trends in the rise of radical populism, which carries with it the potential for political extremism. This radical populism organized through the Internet and fueled by the images of human inequality that are disseminated globally by the electronic media, is also stimulated by the new political reality.”⁵

What we face today are threats associated with the global process of democratization of the world and its concomitant effect of creating all kinds of interdependencies. The current wave of democratization is principally different from the previous three waves analyzed by Huntington and others. Today there is no legitimate ideological alternative to democracy. The new wave of democratization is global and it coincides with the end of the Cold War, the global spread of the market economy and the failure of decolonization which has resulted in the proliferation of weak or failed states. The politicization of cultural and religious identities much more than the rise of religiousness are a distinctive feature of the new populist condition. The clash between the principles of democratic majoritarianism and liberal constitutionalism is a distinctive characteristic of this new wave of democratization that in many parts of the world takes the form of populist revolution. The age of populism is also the age of global comparisons and global media networks. People compare the standard of living where they live with those in the most developed countries. The information revolution has profoundly changed the media environment and the terms of national debates are no longer exclusively determined by nation states.

Even more importantly, the populist revolution that is underway is also taking place in the countries that are considered part of the West. The rise of populist leaders like Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, the victory of the “No Vote” in the referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands and new populist governments in Poland and Slovakia are all developments signaling that the new political reality can have grave security impacts. The populist revolution weakens key institutions of liberal democracy like the independent judiciary, central banks and independent media. Populist leaders gain the support of the people on the back of their mistrust for political elites running scared. During the Cold War, foreign policy and security issues were de facto excluded from the domain of electoral politics due to the nature of the security threat. The failure of the popular and strong Italian Communist Party to enter government during the whole Cold War period is the classical illustration of the strength of Cold War constraints on Western European democratic politics. In the post-Cold War reality in Europe in which economic and many other policy decisions are taken out of the domain of electoral politics and when many key decisions are taken in Brussels, foreign and security policy has once again come to the center. The fall of the

⁵ The Christopher J. Makins Lecture given by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski on May 31, 2006, at the British Ambassador's Residence in Washington, DC. Available at http://www.acus.org/docs/o60531-CJM_Lecture_Brzezinski.pdf.

Aznar government in Spain in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings is a demonstration that elections can be won by foreign policy minded majorities.

It is not possible to understand the nature of global threats, therefore, if we fail to understand the nature of the populist revolution. Voice of the People 2006, the largest worldwide survey conducted by GALLUP International⁶, captures the radical nature of the new populist situation. According to the results of the survey, democracy is accepted as the best form of government by seventy-nine percent of the world population. At the same time, forty-eight percent of the respondents claim that the elections in their countries are not free and fair. And, only thirty percent agree that their countries are governed by the will of the people. Democratic disappointment is particularly strong in Western Europe where a majority of respondents agreed that while elections are free and fair, the will of the people is neglected in their view. We are witnessing a historical impasse. Millions of people are brought into democratic politics, but the newly born democratic institutions quite often fail to meet the expectations of the voters.

Popular will has become the only legitimate source of power. But, this worldwide acceptance of democracy as a norm is accompanied by declining trust in the institutions of representative democracy in the West and the rise of populist leaders in the rest. The rise of the political Islam that is intensively discussed today is just one of the manifestations of the new populist revolution.

The complexity of the populist phenomenon is linked to the fact that populism is difficult to define and generalize. It is anti-liberal but not anti-democratic. It can come from the left, as is the case of Latin America or from the right, as is the case in Europe. The distinctive feature of populism is the perception of politics as a clash between elites and the people. But, the populists oppose not only ruling elites, but also the political and security related consensuses they represent. Populism expresses itself in the form of direct and unmediated relationships between the elite and the people. It favors the instruments of direct democracy like referenda and manifests itself in rebellion of the represented against those who claim to represent them. In the West the rise of populism reflects the new relationship between elites and publics. It marks a loss of the elite's grasp on power. At the same time, the Cold War Western European democracies suffer from a decline in ideological politics, a crisis of mass political parties and the emergence of a freer and much more provocative media.

The Neglected Threat

The rise of populism has been neglected by security analysts and military planners. Populism was viewed as a transitional phenomenon that lacks security implications. But, in the view of this author it is exactly the rise of populism in different parts of the world that should be at the top of the agenda of the NATO Summit in Riga. In the words of the American strategist Steve Ropp *"The potential rise of populism ... should not be viewed by policy planners as posing just another specific type of security threat. For unlike the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive ones normally considered in the future scenarios, populism poses a potential challenge to the underlying political*

6 "Voice of the People 2006: What the World Thinks on Today's Global Issues", Gallup International Assoc., March 2006, <http://www.gallup-international.com/>.

substructure that has given us the collective material capability and moral legitimacy to deal with all these threats”.⁷

The rise of populism also presents a major conceptual challenge to the democratic peace theory that was the ideological framework behind NATO's strategy in the 1990s. In their recently published book “Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War” two outstanding scholars of international relations, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, use rigorous statistical analysis to demonstrate that since 1815 democratizing states have been more prone to start wars than either democracies or authoritarian regimes. In other words, the democratic peace theory is correct when claiming that liberal democracies do not fight one another, but at the same time it is also true that populist democracies (electoral democracies with weak or broken constitutional constraints) are more prone to start a war than any other regime.

The security impact of the rise of populism inside and outside the West will have and already has a profound impact on the security dilemmas that NATO faces. The rise of populism and the emergence of populist governments among NATO member states can block the decision-making process in the Alliance and thus make it a useless instrument. The withdrawal of Italian and Spanish troops from Iraq after a change of government in both already indicates the new strategic uncertainty. The decision of the Spanish and Italian governments marks a break with Cold War democratic politics that kept security issues and particularly NATO outside of electoral politics.

Imagine that at the next NATO Summit the French delegation would be lead by Jean Marie Le Pen, the Polish delegation by Andrzej Lepper and Bulgarian delegation by Volen Siderov, the extreme anti-NATO nationalist who reached the second round of the presidential elections just a month ago. In Europe, it is no longer possible to take for granted the democratic foundations that the old Cold War environment guaranteed. Forces for change are afoot which render the assumption that we can treat this base as a “constant” null and void. In the new populist context elites and foreign policy experts lose their grasp on foreign policy making in the NATO member states and public opinion becomes able to directly determine its conduct.

The decision of the French Parliament that further enlargements of the EU should be decided by a popular referendum is a clear illustration of this new trend. The result will be that foreign policy will move away from the pragmatic center. The principal beneficiary of the populist shift in foreign policy decision making in some of the NATO member states are nationalists and isolationists, two groups that can mobilize the emotions in public opinion. What we can expect is a higher degree of unpredictability in the foreign policies of the member states including a unilateral use of veto on some critical missions of the Alliance. A dysfunctional NATO is a major danger of the rise of populism in the member states. The rise of populism in the member states will also profoundly affect the attractiveness of the Alliance, its capacity to be an “aspirational club” that many want to join.

The rise of populism outside of NATO's member states presents a threat in several respects too. In the first place, in the case of intervention in many parts of the world, NATO forces will face increasing difficulties to control the situation on the ground and to reach lasting deals with local elites in case of populist mobilization. This will

⁷ Steve C. Ropp, “The Strategic Implications of the Rise of Populism in Europe and South America”, Council of Foreign Relations, SSI, Autumn 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9893/ssi.html?breadcrumb=defaultexception%20Rob>

increase the likelihood of civil war. The war in Iraq proved correct Raymond Aaron's observation that "*permanent insecurity represents the victory of the rebels over the pacifying forces. The rebels win if they manage to survive. The pacifying forces lose unless they gain complete victory*".⁸ Secondly, the rise of populism and populist governments in power will increase the likelihood of the nationalization of natural resources and will intensify resource war. Chavez's Venezuela is an illustration of this tendency. Third, the rise of populism is accompanied and strengthened by the rise of nuclear nationalism. The unintended consequence of a decade of humanitarian wars in the 1990s is the urge for nuclear weapons. What we observe today is the coupling of the classical idea of sovereignty with the idea of nuclear weapons. This is pushing the world into an age of nuclear sovereignty.

Fourth, the uncertainty provoked by the behavior of NATO's populist allies in the different parts of the world is another negative impact of the rise of populism. The recent conflict between Georgia and Russia can be treated as a case in point. NATO cannot ignore the legitimate security concerns of the Georgian government and withdraw its support from Georgia without suffering a crisis of confidence and losing its geopolitical position in the Caucasus. Any distancing of NATO from Georgia will play in the hands of Moscow's hegemonic post-colonial presence in the post-Soviet space. At the same time NATO's strategic relationship with Russia cannot be held hostage to the populism of the government in Tbilisi. Fifth, the rise of anti-Americanism as one of the political manifestations of the global populist revolution presents a further dilemma in the global security equation. Anti-Americanism is a complex and contextual phenomenon and easy generalization about it can be counter-productive. At the same time we cannot remain blind to the fact that the global rise of anti-Americanism is one of the by-products of the global populist revolution. In security terms, the presence of widespread and politicized anti-American sentiments will dramatically increase the costs of U.S. involvement in many parts of the world (consider Latin America and the Middle East) and at the same time will create incentives for Europeans to minimize their involvement in U.S.-led operations. Sixth and finally, the emergence of anti-Western populist alliances is a significant threat. The recent unholy alliance between Teheran, Caracas and Damascus signals the likelihood of the emergence of further such alliances. These are not the anti-hegemonic alliances predicted by the realists but alliances rooted in the political mobilization of popular emotions. Chavez's cooperation with Teheran does not increase Venezuela's security. It increases the global popularity of the leader of the Bolivarian revolution.

8 Raymond Aron, "The Dawn of Universal History: Selected Essays from a Witness to the Twentieth Century", Basic Books, New York, 2002, pp. 1 - 544.

NATO's Response

In this new populist context NATO faces three major challenges. First, to regain the support of public opinion in the member states. Second, to prevent dysfunctionality in the decision-making process resulting from the emergence of populist governments. And, third, to develop a common, security sensitive, agenda for democracy promotion

The cost of veto has been significantly reduced with the end of the Cold War. NATO needs new instruments for peer pressure, even an exclusion clause in the case of non-democratic and anti-constitutional political developments in a member state. NATO enlargement played a significant role for the consolidation of democracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance was particularly successful in integrating the communist military into the new democratic system. But, now when the new democracies are members of the club, NATO does not have instruments to influence the democratic process and to prevent security threats coming from anti-liberal developments in one or another of its member states. It is in the context of the growing danger posed by the rise of populism in security decision making that NATO can reassess the attractiveness of re-organizing itself as a two pillar alliance. The cost for blocking decisions is higher for the member states of the EU than for those of NATO. The adoption of even a minimalist EU constitution will make that cost even higher. In responding to the populist challenge, NATO should consider once again a more direct link between the policy-making in the EU and NATO. The adoption of a common transatlantic democracy promotion agenda that will reconcile the need for supporting democracy and the need to reduce the risks of instability caused by the populist revolutions should be an essential part of NATO's response to populism.

To conclude, this author wants to stress that the age of the populist revolution has begun. It is not possible to understand the nature of the global threat, if we fail to understand the nature of these revolutions. NATO has neglected the security risks emanating from the transformation of democratic regimes within the Alliance's own member states. During the Cold War, foreign policy and security issues were de facto excluded from the domain of electoral politics due to the nature of the security threat. Now, these issues are at the center of electoral politics in the old and new democracies in Europe. The only way for NATO to go global without becoming the victim of a populist backlash in its member states is by transforming itself into a two-pillar alliance.

About the Author

Ivan Krastev is a Political Scientist and Chairman of the Board of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria. Since 2004, Ivan Krastev has been the Executive Director of the International Commission on the Balkans chaired by the former Italian Prime Minister, Giuliano Amato. He is the Director of the Open Century Project of the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. In 2006, Ivan Krastev was awarded membership in the Forum of Young Global Leaders, a partner organization of the World Economic Forum. His latest book in English is *Shifting Obsessions: Three Essays on the Politics of Anticorruption*, published by Central European University Press in 2004. A further volume entitled *The Anti-American Century*, edited by Alan McPherson and Ivan Krastev is forthcoming in 2006, also published by Central European University Press. Ivan Krastev is the Editor in Chief of the Bulgarian edition of Foreign Policy. Ivan Krastev's latest articles are published in the Journal of Democracy, open Democracy and Europe's World.

About the Organizers of the Riga Conference

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and Europe. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes, and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, and Ankara (www.gmfus.org).

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation

The Latvian Transatlantic Organisation (LATO) is a non-governmental organization established in March 2000 to promote Latvia's full and active membership in NATO and to work for international security and democracy in NATO and the EU near neighborhood region. It unites members from different social groups in terms of age and professional interests. LATO was established with the objective of facilitating Latvia's membership in NATO. Education and information activities, aimed at increasing public support for NATO membership, have been carried out. These activities explained and built public awareness about the principles and values that unite NATO member states. Since Latvia achieved its main foreign policy goal of joining the EU and NATO, LATO has continued its work providing information on international defense and security issues and questions related to Latvia's full participation in NATO. LATO has also

become an active partner in the promotion of democratic values and the strengthening of civil society in the neighboring region, including Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. The scope of LATO activities is both local and international. Its activities include conferences, seminars, summer schools and work with partner organizations and mass media. The LATO Information Center ensures accessibility of information and facilitates understanding about security and defense policy questions, as well as encouraging interest in participation in LATO activities.

The Commission of Strategic Analysis

Latvia's Commission of Strategic Analysis under the auspices of the President of the Republic of Latvia was established on April 2, 2004, at the initiative of the President of Latvia, Dr. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. Its founding resolution was jointly signed by the President and the Prime Minister. The Commission's main goal is to generate a long-term vision of Latvia's development through interdisciplinary and future-oriented studies. The Commission of Strategic Analysis is a think tank that seeks to consolidate Latvia's scholarly potential for the benefit of Latvia's future development. It has undertaken research on Latvia's opportunities as a member of the European Union and NATO, along with Latvia's place in global development processes. The Commission also stimulates high-quality dialogue with the country's legislative and executive powers, as well as the general public, on matters that concern Latvia's development and the consolidation of democracy.


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STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

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